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ABSTRACT
Section 7 of the United States’ National Labor Relations Act
allows groups of American workers to engage in concerted activity
for the purposes of collective bargaining or for “other mutual aid
or protection.” This latter protection has been extended in cases
such as Lafayette Park Hotel to workers outside the union context.
Starting in 2005, the National Labor Relations Board increasingly
signaled to employers that concerted activity may take place on
social media such as Facebook. However, the Board proper
delivered its first written opinion articulating these rules in the
2012 case of Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc. There, the Board
found the employer in question to have committed multiple unfair
labor practices when it fired five employees over a series of
Facebook posts due to violating the employer’s zero-tolerance no
bullying policy.
This article argues that the majority opinion of the Board
misapplied Lafayette Park Hotel’s test for whether employer
conduct “would reasonably tend to chill employees” from
legitimate, protected uses of their §7 rights. This article explains
the two largest errors in the Board’s decision: (1) a failure to
identify a missing, important element for concerted activity
protection under §7, the nexus between employee discussion and
contemplated group action, and (2) asserting an “inferred group
intent” existed that was “implicitly manifest” which linked the
employees’ Facebook posts to contemplated group action protected
under §7.
Members of the entire Board, as well as other legal scholars
writing on this topic, have been guilty at different times of
simplifying social media to being like a “virtual water cooler” for
the 21st century. The facts in Hispanics United show why this
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analogy does not work: rather than a short face-to-face
conversation with a finite, known audience in the space of minutes,
it was a series of written messages plopped down in sequential
order throughout an entire day, written for an audience of unknown
size and make-up that may not even include the co-workers it
ostensibly addressed. As Hispanics United helps illustrate, the
proper handling of employer retaliation on social media remains
the sensible application of the established nexus requirement for
finding concerted activity.

INTRODUCTION
‘Then you should say what you mean,’ the March Hare went on.
‘I do,’ Alice hastily replied; … ‘at least I mean what I say–’
‘Not the same thing a bit!’ said the Hatter.
LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND

Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) enshrines
the right of certain classes of American workers to engage in concerted
activity for the purpose of collective bargaining or “other mutual aid and
protection.”1 Not only is it illegal for employers to retaliate against
employees who have engaged in concerted actions,2 it is also illegal for
employers to adopt company rules that “would reasonably tend to chill
employees” in using their § 7 rights.3 The National Labor Relations Board
(“NLRB”), the federal agency established by the NLRA for its enforcement,
4
interprets § 7 protection to apply outside the union context when (1)
multiple employees (2) do an activity in concert (3) for those employees’
mutual aid or protection, with a nexus between the activity performed and
the employees’ “interests as employees.”5
In the seminal case of Hispanics United, the National Labor
Relations Board answered how traditional §7 protection works in the new
1

National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
Id. § 158(a)(1); see also NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969)
(“If there is any implication that an employer may or may not take action solely on
his own initiative for reasons unrelated to economic necessities and known only to
him, then it is a threat of retaliation based on misrepresentation and coercion not
protected under the First Amendment.”).
3
Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. 824, 25 (1998).
4
National Labor Relations Act § 3.
5
See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 567-8 (1978) (“[S]ome concerted
activity bears a less immediate relationship to employees’ interests as employees
than other such activity. We may assume that at some point the relationship
becomes so attenuated that an activity cannot fairly be deemed to come within the
“mutual aid or protection” clause.”).
2
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context of social media.6 This case was the first case tried7 before the NLRB
providing the Board’s reasoning process for employees’ protection under §
7 of the NLRA when using social media in a non-union workplace.8 As the
dissent in the case notes, Hispanics United expands the boundaries for when
co-workers officially “join in” an activity protected under § 7.9
Existing legal scholarship describes the decisions leading up to
Hispanics United in great detail.10 This Note instead focuses on the Board’s
ruling in Hispanics United, and explains why it is an unusual decision, even
when compared to these earlier cases. As Board member Hayes explains in
his dissent, the Hispanics United majority erred by inferring a concerted
objective where employees “did not suggest or implicitly contemplate doing
anything in response,” but only engaged in unprotected “mere griping.”11
This Note also challenges both the majority and the dissent’s
characterization of social media as the 21st century’s “virtual water
cooler.”12 This comparison emerges in much other legal scholarship on how
both employers and the legal system treat or ought to treat social media.13
6

Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 (2012).
In 2011 the NLRB reached a settlement with American Medical Response of
Connecticut, Inc., after the NLRB’s office in Hartford, CT issued a Complaint
against AMR on Oct. 27, 2010, based on the discharge of an employee for posting
negative comments about her supervisor on her Facebook page. See Brian Hall,
NLRB’s “Facebook Firing” Case Against AMR Settles, EMPLOYER LAW REPORT
(Mar. 18, 2013, 12:00 PM), http://www.employerlawreport.com/2011/02/articles/
workforce-strategies/nlrbs-facebook-firing-case-against-amr-settles.
8
Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 at 2.
9
See id. at *5-6 (Hayes, dissenting).
10
See Robert Sprague, Facebook Meets the NLRB: Employee Online
Communications and Unfair Labor Practices, 14 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 957, 962-3
(2012) (Examining in detail 36 different charges addressed by the NLRB, its Office
of the General Counsel, and its Administrative Law Judges, filed by employees for
discipline or discharge that employees allege occurred because of online
communications, principally Facebook); Bryan Russell, Facebook Firings and
Twitter Terminations: The National Labor Relations Act as a Limit on Retaliatory
Discharge, 8 Wash. J. L. Tech. & Arts 29, 33-39 (2012).
11
Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 at *5 (Hayes, dissenting).
12
Id.; see also Mark Pearce, Chairman, NLRB, quoted in Stephen Greenhouse,
Even If It Enrages Your Boss, Social Net Speech Is Protected, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22,
2013, at A1 (“Many view social media as the new water cooler . . . All we’re doing
is applying traditional rules to new technology.”).
13
See Christine O’Brien, 45 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 29, 66 (2011) for an example of
formal legal scholarship making a similar analogy (“The web is where employees
gather for what used to be onsite “water cooler” discussions regarding terms and
conditions of employment.”); see also Greenhouse, supra note 12, at A1, for similar
analogy used in general news press (“As Facebook and Twitter become as central
to workplace conversation as the company cafeteria, federal regulators are ordering
employers to scale back policies . . .”).
7
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But despite social media’s differences from other media, these differences
do not require the Board to abandon its previous approach towards what
constitutes concerted activity, as other writers suggest.14 Instead, as Board
member Hayes suggests in his dissent,15 the social media paradigm requires
a return to the nexus requirement for concerted action.
To serve the original Congressional intent of balancing the interests
of employer and employees, existing labor law must be applied in the same
way it was always applied to the new realities of social media. This requires
asking that plaintiffs meet the initial burden of proof that Hayes demanded
and that the majority conceded in Hispanics United: plaintiffs must allege
facts establishing a nexus linking employee online conduct with the
workplace. The only other alternative requires the majority’s approach in
Hispanics United: softening the elements required to show that an employer
unreasonably chilled an employee’s § 7 rights. In Hispanics United, the
majority accomplished this by identifying an “implicitly manifest” mutual
aid objective in the co-workers’ Facebook posts. The majority’s approach is
the wrong treatment of concerted activity in social media, for three
fundamental reasons: it goes against the language and purpose of the
National Labor Relations Act, it is unfair to employers, and it is a shortsighted treatment of social media as being so innovative that it mandates
changing existing labor law as we know it.

I. FACTS AND HOLDINGS FROM HISPANICS UNITED
A. Facts of the Case
Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc. (HUB), a non-profit in New York
state,16 employed 30 individuals,17 including Lydia Cruz-Moore and the
alleged discriminatees Mariana Cole-Rivera, Damicela Rodriguez, Ludamar
14

See Ariana C. Green, Note, Using Social Networking To Discuss Work: NLRB
Protection for Derogatory Employee Speech and Concerted Activity, 27 Berkeley
Tech. L.J. 837, 888-9 (2012) (“[T]he General Counsel should allow NLRB
attorneys more leeway in interpreting when online speech is protected on social
networks. Precedent based on standards of concerted activity and opprobrious
behavior serve in some cases, but in others, the attorneys should display more
agility in considering the context of social networking posts.”) (emphasis added).
15
Cf. Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 at *5 (Hayes, dissenting) (“[T]he
mere fact that the subject of discussion involve[s] an aspect of employment—i.e.,
job performance—is not enough to find concerted activity for mutual aid and
protection. There is a meaningful distinction between sharing a common viewpoint
and joining in a common cause. Only the latter involves group action for mutual aid
and protection.”)
16
Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 at *9.
17
Id. at *12.
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“Ludahy” Rodriguez, Yaritza Campos, and Carlos Ortiz de Jesus.18 During
their employment, in personal conversations and text messages with ColeRivera and the other discriminatees, Cruz-Moore had criticized other HUB
employees for performing poorly at work. 19 On October 9, this alleged
pattern of criticism came to a head in a conversation thread Cole-Rivera
created on her own Facebook page.20 Cole-Rivera’s original post was
prompted by Cruz-Moore informing Cole-Rivera earlier that day, “that she
was going to raise these concerns with [HUB’s] executive director, Lourdes
Iglesias.”21 Perhaps anticipating that Cruz-Moore would allege to Iglesias
that Cole-Rivera and other HUB employees performed poorly at work, and
exasperated after hearing Cruz-Moore’s past complaints about the same,
Cole-Rivera wrote about it on her profile page that day.
Board member Hayes’s dissent alludes to the Facebook postings on
October 9th as being like a “colloquy around the Facebook ‘virtual water
cooler.’”22 However, while both the majority and dissent in Hispanics
United seem comfortable with treating the employees’ postings like an
instantaneous conversation between co-workers, the conversation thread
was in fact a series of posts exchanged over approximately twelve hours as
people checked into and out of Facebook during the morning and
afternoon.23 The sequence of the five discriminatees’ Facebook posts is as
follows:
Table 1: Alleged Discriminatees’ Initial Facebook Posts24
Time
Elapsed

Time of Poster
Post

#

10:14am

Mariana
ColeRivera

Lydia Cruz, a coworker feels
that we don’t help our clients
enough at HUB I about had it!
My fellow coworkers how do
u
feel?

+5 #min.

10:19am

Damicela
Rodriguez

What the f. .. Try doing my
job
I have 5 programs

1

2

18

Text of Post

Id. at *10-11.
Id. at *10.
20
Id. at *10-11.
21
Id. at *10.
22
Id. at *5 (Hayes, dissenting).
23
Id. at *10-11.
24
Id. (using the unaltered text from original Facebook posts in the Text of Post
column).
19
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Ludimar
Rodriguez

What the Hell, we don’t have
a life as is, What else can we
do???

+45# min. 11:11am

Yaritza
Campos

Tell her to come do mt
fucking job n c if I don’t do
enough, this is just dum

+30# min. 11:41am

Carlos
I think we should give our
Ortiz de paychecks to our clients so
Jesus
they can “pay” the rent, also
we can take them to their Dr’s
appts,
and
served
as
translators (oh! We do that).
Also we can clean their
houses, we can go to DSS for
them and we can run all their
errands and they can spend
their day in their house
watching tv, and also we can
go to do their grocery shop
and organized the food in their
house pantries … (insert
sarcasm here now)

+ 4#min.

Mariana
ColeRivera

+ 7#min.

10:26am

3

4

5

6
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11:45am

Lol. I know! I think it is
difficult for someone that is
not at HUB 24-7 to really
grasp and understand what we
do ..I will give her that.
Clients
will
complain
especially when they ask for
services we don’t provide, like
washer, dryers stove and
refrigerators, I’m proud to
work at HUB and you are all
my family and I see what you
do and yes, some things may
fall thru the cracks, but we are
all human:) love ya guys

The conversation began to diverge after noon, with individuals
responding to Facebook posts that were not in sequence and not only
responding to the immediately preceding post.
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Table 2: Facebook Posts, Upon Becoming Nonsequential / Off-Topic25
Time
Elapsed

Time of Poster
Post

+25#min. 12:10pm

Nannette
Dorrios26

Who is Lydia Cruz?

+26#min. 12:11pm

Yaritza
Campos

(responding to #6) Luv ya too
boo

+ 1#min.

Mariana
ColeRivera

(responding to #7) She’s from
the dv program works at the
FJC at hub once a week.

+58#min. 1:10pm

Jessica
Rivera27

Is it not overwhelming enough
over there?

+ 1#hour, 2:27pm
17 min.

Lydia
CruzMoore

Marianna stop with ur lies
about me. I’ll b at HUB
Tuesday..

+29#min. 2:56pm

Mariana
ColeRivera

Lies? Ok. In any case Lydia,
Magalie28 is inviting us over
to her house today after
6:00pm and wanted to invite
you but does not have your
number i'll inbox you her
phone number if you wish.

+9 #
hours,
34 min.

Carlos
Ortiz

(responding to #12) Bueno el
martes llevo el pop corn
[Good, Tuesday, I’ll bring the
popcorn]29.

7
8
12:12pm

9

10
11

12

13

Text of Post

10:30pm

Lydia Cruz-Moore then complained in a text message to HUB’s
Executive Director, Iglesias, about the Facebook posts from her coworkers.30 The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) who first heard this case
stated that Cruz-Moore “was trying to get Iglesias to terminate or at least
discipline the employees,” even though it was “not clear why she bore such
25

Id.
Nannette Dorrios serves as a member of HUB’s Board of Directors (id.
(alteration in original)).
27
Jessica Rivera serves as Secretary to HUD Director Iglesias (id. (alteration in
original)).
28
Magalie Lomax, HUB’s Business Manager (id. (alteration in original)).
29
Id. (alteration in original).
30
Id.
26
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animosity against the other employees” against whom she had no readily
apparent prior dispute.31
Three days after Cruz-Moore complained about the Facebook posts,
Executive Director Iglesias met individually with all five employees who
posted the Facebook comments in Table 1.32 Iglesias told each employee
that they had violated HUB’s zero-tolerance employee policy against
bullying or harassment of co-workers.33 At these meetings, Iglesias also
alleged that Cruz-Moore suffered a heart attack because of the bullying, and
that HUB needed to pay compensation to Cruz-Moore in response. 34 At the
trial level, however, the ALJ found that there was zero evidence that a heart
attack had ever occurred. 35 In fact, the ALJ found that Iglesias lacked any
rational basis for believing that the discriminatees’ Facebook posts were at
all related to Cruz-Moore’s health.36 Nevertheless, Iglesias told each of the
five discriminatees “that she would have to fire them.” The individual
employees received termination letters either on the spot or else several
days later in their mailboxes.37 HUB never replaced any of the fired
employees, and instead seemed to absorb the drop in labor from thirty to
twenty-five employees by giving their work responsibilities to other
employees.38

B. Holdings in Hispanics United: Concerted Activity Occurred, for
Implicitly Manifest Goal
Affirming the ALJ’s decision, a three-member majority of the
NLRB found that (1) the Facebook postings by Cole-Rivera and the four
other employees in Table 1 were concerted activity protected under § 7 of
the NLRA, and that (2) HUB’s discharges of these five employees because
of the Facebook postings were unfair labor practices in violation of §
8(a)(1) of the Act.39 The Board also adopted the ALJ’s recommended
remedy, ordering HUB to compensate the discriminatees for lost earnings
and benefits, in addition to offering full reinstatement to their former
positions.40

31

See id.
Id. at *11-12. Iglesias did not meet with her secretary Jessica Rivera, who
posted Comment #10 at 1:10pm. Id.
33
Id. at *12.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id. (emphasis added).
38
Id.
39
Id. at *4.
40
Id. at *4, *15-16.
32
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The NLRB’s opinion in Hispanics United begins by examining
Meyers Indus., Inc. (Meyers I) for the standard for when an employer’s
discipline or discharge of an individual employee violates § 8(a)(1) and is
considered an unfair labor practice.41 Under Meyers I, § 8(a)(1) is violated
when (1) the employee engages in concerted activity (within § 7’s
meaning), (2) the employer knew of the concerted nature of the employee’s
activity, (3) the concerted activity was protected under the NLRA, and (4)
the discipline or discharge was motivated by the employee’s activity.42 The
Board took elements (2) and (4) as undisputed, because HUB had fired the
employees after making print-outs of the entire Facebook thread on ColeRivera’s profile page, and because the discriminatees had all posted
comments responding to other employees’ posts.43 Instead, the Board
centered its analysis on elements (1) and (3).44 Because Hayes’s and this
Note’s analysis focus on the majority’s treatment of element (1), the
Board’s findings on element (3) (whether the NLRA protects the activity if
at all) will be examined first, followed by its findings on element (1)
(whether the employee’s activity was concerted for purposes of § 7
protection).
1. Held: The NLRA Protects Employee Discussions on Social Media About
Work Performance.
The Board cited two separate cases for the “long held” proposition
“that Section 7 protects employee discussions about their job
performance.”45 However, both of these can be distinguished from the facts
in Hispanics United, because employees that have received § 7 protection
have always done something more than just talk.46
In the first case the Board cited, Praxair Distribution, two
employees brought various work-related grievances to their managers.47 The
employer committed an unfair labor practice by firing the two employees
after their complaints.48 Praxair is unlike Hispanics United because in
41

Id. at *2.
Meyers Indus., Inc. (I), 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 497 (1984). The Board’s analysis
also included the expanded Meyers II definition of concerted activity, which
includes an individual’s activity when done to initiate, induce, or prepare for
group action. Meyers Indus., Inc. (II), 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 887 (1986). See below
Part I.B.2 for a description of the Board’s reasoning using both Meyers
decisions.
43
Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 at *2 n.8.
44
Id. at *2.
45
Id. at *3 (citing Praxair Distrib., Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 91 at *11 (2011);
Jhirmack Enters., 283 N.L.R.B. 609, 609 n.2 (1987)).
46
Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 at *6 (Hayes, dissenting).
47
Praixair Distrib., Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 91 at *11.
48
Id.
42
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Hispanics United neither Cole-Rivera nor any other employees told or
planned to tell management about Cruz-Moore’s complaints, but only
discussed the anticipated complaints between themselves.49 The Hispanics
United circumvents this distinction by finding a shared intent to speak to
management to have been implied in the HUB employees’ private speech,50
though nothing the employees wrote actually indicates this.51
The other case the majority cites, Jhirmack Enterprises,52 is
distinguishable because of what was said and to whom. There, the
discriminatee was not merely telling a co-worker that other employees
complained about the slow pace of his work, but was trying to “encourage
[the co-worker others complained about] to take corrective action to protect
his job.”53 Furthermore, the discriminatee represented a group of co-workers
who were concerned about how one co-worker’s slow performance
adversely affected the terms and conditions of every other employee’s job,
such as by reducing the group’s chances for winning a weekly production
award and by increasing the possibility of the company’s employees being
asked to work overtime.54
The Board’s misplaced reliance on Praxair and Jhirmack allowed it
to conclude with too little legal analysis that HUB employees’
conversations about Cruz-Moore’s complaining might be protected under
the NLRA as a form of concerted activity. However, the dissent Hayes’s
opposite position, that the NLRA clearly does not protect conversations on
these topics, is not well-supported by case law either. Instead, the entire
Board ought to have started at the statute’s language rather than case law:
was the conversation “for those employees’ mutual aid or protection,”55 or
not? Perhaps the employees were not building an anticipatory defense to
Cruz-Moore’s complaints with their Facebook posts, but were achieving
other mutually-beneficial aims that § 7 would protect. Cole-Rivera’s post
made the targets of Cruz-Moore’s complaints aware of Cruz-Moore’s
intentions, as well as non-targeted employees with connections to HUB’s

49

Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 at *6, n.6 (Hayes, dissenting).
Id. at *3.
51
See supra Tables 1, 2, and accompanying notes 24 and 25. One co-worker,
Yaritza Campos, suggested telling Cruz-Moore to do Campos’s job, but there
were no other suggestions about saying anything to anyone else with HUB, let
alone HUB management such as Iglesias. See id.
52
Jhirmack Enters., 283 N.L.R.B. 609, 609 (1987).
53
Id. at n.2.
54
Id.
55
National Labor Relations Act § 3.
50
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management.56 The discriminatees’ Facebook posts also likely relieved
workplace stress among Cole-Rivera and her co-workers.57
Rather than examine any alternative ends achieved by the HUB
employees’ Facebook conversation, both the majority and dissent in
Hispanics United studied only one possible objective of the Facebook
posts—preparing a group defense to Cruz-Moore’s complaints.58 Focusing
on this one possibility tied this part of the legal analysis to the acting-inconcert test: either the employees had responded to one another’s posts
intending a prepared, cohesive response to Cruz-Moore’s charges, or they
were individually griping about work conditions and venting to one another.
As the following section explains, the majority erred at this point in
identifying an “implicitly manifest” group objective in the sparse text in
these Facebook posts.
2. Held: HUB Employees’ Facebook Posts Constituted Concerted Activity
Between the Employees, and Was Protected Under § 7.
The Board also held that the employees’ actions constituted
concerted action, even though “Cole-Rivera failed to tell her co-workers
that Cruz-Moore was going to voice her criticisms to Iglesias.”59 This was
based on the Board’s dual definition of concerted activity from its two
Meyers decisions:


Meyers I: Activity which is “engaged in with or on the
authority of other employees, and not solely by and on
behalf of the employee himself.”60



Meyers II: Activity in “those circumstances where
individual employees seek to initiate or to induce or to
prepare for group action, as well as individual
employees bringing truly group complaints to the
attention of management.”61

The Board held that Cole-Rivera’s own activity in making her
initial Facebook post62 was concerted under the Meyers II expanded
definition of concerted activity, because “Cole-Rivera’s Facebook
communication [under all the circumstances] had the clear ‘mutual aid’
56

See text accompanying notes 26–-28 supra.
See supra Table 1 accompanying note 24, row #6 (Cole-Rivera expressed
appreciation to the other four discriminatees for their work at HUB and their
responses to her original post).
58
Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 at *3.
59
Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 at *2–-3.
60
Meyers Indus., Inc. (Meyers I), 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 497 (1984).
61
Meyers Indus., Inc. (Meyers II), 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 887 (1986).
62
Table 1, supra note24, Post #1.
57
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objective of preparing her coworkers for a group defense” to Lydia CruzMoore’s complaints to HUB’s Executive Director Iglesias.63 The objective
was clear “[e]ven absent an express announcement about the object of
[Cole-Rivera’s] activity [because] ‘a concerted objective may be inferred
from a variety of circumstances in which employees might discuss or seek
to address concerns about workings conditions.’”64
The Board also held the activity of all five alleged discriminatees in
posting and reposting on Cole-Rivera’s Facebook page as being concerted
activity under definitions from either Meyers case. According to the
majority opinion in Hispanics United, their activity was concerted under
Meyers I because “Cole-Rivera’s four coworkers made common cause with
her, and, together [they undertook actions] with . . . other employees.” 65
Alternatively, the five employees’ conduct was concerted under Meyers II
because “they were taking a first step towards taking group action to defend
themselves against the accusations they could reasonably believe CruzMoore was going to make to management.”66
The NLRB’s alternative theories for why the alleged discriminatees
acted in concert all suffer from a lack of supporting evidence in the case’s
facts.67 Going back to § 7’s actual language, activity is protected under the
NLRA when “[e]mployees . . . engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”68
Section 7 affords protection only to employees acting on theirs and others’
interest. Yet the Acting General Counsel for the NLRA offered no evidence
showing that the original Facebook post or the subsequent posts were done
for the mutual aid or protection of the other employees that posted on ColeRivera’s Facebook wall.69 The ALJ discredited testimony from Cole-Rivera
that she was planning to speak with Executive Director Iglesias in response
to Cruz-Moore’s complaints.70 This discredited testimony directly
undermines the majority’s assertion that Cole-Rivera’s first Facebook post
“had the clear ‘mutual aid’ objective of preparing her coworkers for a group
defense.”71 While the majority is correct that “that the intent to be engaged

63

Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 at *3.
Id. (quoting Relco Locomotives, Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 37, *2 (2012)).
65
Id. at *2.
66
Id. (quoting Administrative Law Judge Amchan, at *14).
67
Id. at *5 (Hayes, dissenting).
68
National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006) (emphasis added).
69
Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 at *5-6 (Hayes, dissenting).
70
Id. at *6, n.6.
71
Id. at *3 (per curiam).
64
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in group action need not be expressly stated [but] can be inferred,” this still
requires something from which the necessary intent may be inferred.72
The fundamental problem in the Hispanics United majority’s
analysis is the absence of an essential ingredient: there was simply no
“evidence of a nexus between employee discussions and group action.”73
Evidence linking employee talk to possible group action must exist for § 7
protection over that talk. Without contemplated group action, talk between
employees remains just mere talk.74 This basic, obvious rule appears in Daly
Park Nursing Home,75 a case cited in Hayes’s dissent. In Daly, one
employee spoke with his co-workers about another co-worker’s discharge,
but was not protected under the NLRA because “there [was] no evidence
that [the employee, or any others she spoke with,] contemplated doing
anything about the discharge.”76 The majority in Hispanics United seeks to
differentiate Daly by claiming that, “[r]ather than preparing for group
action,” the employee in Daly and her co-workers had agreed that group
action would be futile.77 There was no such agreement in Daly, however—
only comments from the alleged discriminatee, that “the discharge was
‘unfair’ and that it was a shame [that the discharged co-worker] could not
hire a lawyer[, and that hopefully that co-worker] would at least be able to
receive unemployment compensation.”78 The Daly discriminatee’s
comments only reflected the belief that the co-worker could not do
anything; the discriminatee said nothing about whether the other employees
could do something in concert to change this outcome. The HU majority
imputes this disbelief in concerted action’s effectiveness onto the Daly
discriminatee, once again without supporting evidence from the record. It is
a false distinction that impermissibly lets the HU majority get away with
ignoring the rule in Daly.
The Hispanics United majority’s logic inverts the nexus
requirement shown in Daly: it not only presumes that employees will
always intend to do something about dissatisfaction with anything to do
with work, but will intend to do something in concert. There is no evidence
of such intent in Hispanics United: none of the HUB employees alluded to
future activities that they fully intended to do in the future.79 The HUB
employees expressed outrage towards Cruz-Moore’s criticism, but not one
72

See also id. at *6, n.7 (Hayes, dissenting) (identifying the absence of calls to
action or planned future action in the Facebook posts).
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Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 at *6 (Hayes, dissenting).
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287 N.L.R.B. 710 (1987).
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Id. at 711.
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79
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wrote anything suggesting going to Iglesias or any other HUB managers.80
In the three intervening days between the Facebook conversation and
Iglesias’s termination of the alleged discriminatees, not one of the
discriminatees went to management to discuss or rebut what Cruz-Moore
said or would say.81 Nevertheless, the majority in Hispanics United asserts
that all five discriminatees’ intent to respond in concert to Cruz-Moore’s
complaints was “implicitly manifest from the surrounding circumstances.”82
The Board’s treatment of the discriminatees’ actions on Facebook
(and the discriminatees’ subsequent inaction for three whole days) likely
stems from basic, prevailing misunderstandings in labor law over how
people actually use social media. In Hispanics United, the Board misapplied
the law when it looked past whether anything the discriminatees actually
said on Facebook indicated or predicated concerted activity or attempts
thereof. The Board skipped the traditional nexus requirement by
interpolating an “implicitly manifest” intent to act from the HUB
employees’ Facebook complaints. Interpolating a call to action from mere
employee griping on social media is error, however. As the next section
explains, social media’s very nature limits the probative effect of
interactions like Facebook posts. In response to how little social media
interactions actually tell us, labor law ought to demand more explicit
evidence of some connection between what people say on social media and
what they intend to effect.

II. SOCIAL MEDIA, AND THE EMPLOYEE’S INTENT TO ACT IN
CONCERT
A. Analysis of NLRB’s Treatment of Social Media in Hispanics
United
Both the majority and the dissenting opinions in Hispanics United
misconstrue the nature of social media. The best example of this
categorizing mistake, occurring in both HU and in legal scholarship, is that
of Facebook being like a water cooler in an office setting where employees
meet and share news or gossip.83 Any treatment of social media under labor
law as just a “place where people talk” ignores many important differences
between social media and other modes of communication. Understanding
these differences is key to applying tried-and-true labor law to social media
communication in a way that is consistent with the existing corpus of labor
law.
80
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First, the amount of time between different individuals’ responses
on social media can vary significantly. In Cole-Rivera’s Facebook
discussion, for example, the time that elapsed between new comments to
her original post ranged from under a minute to nearly ten hours.84 The
potential length of time between communications makes social media
conversation less like a personal or telephone conversation and more like an
exchange of traditional post. This variability in the time between responses
cuts both ways, however; that traditional post letter will never be read five
minutes after being sent, but a Twitter tweet or Facebook post may be read
near-instantaneously, depending on message recipients’ access to social
media at that specific moment of delivery.
Cole-Rivera’s initial Facebook post and the subsequent comments
also reflect their authors’ uncertainty regarding how many people may read
or respond to their posts, and even who those people might be. Cole-Rivera
addressed her original post to her “fellow coworkers,”85 yet her post
received responses from a larger audience. This unanticipated larger
audience included the administrative assistant to HUB’s executive director,
a member of HUB’s board of directors, and the very same person ColeRivera criticized in her initial post.86 The actual audience was also
underinclusive of Cole-Rivera’s addressed audience, at least according to
the scant evidence in the record. HUB employed a total of 30 employees
prior to firing Cole-Rivera and the other alleged discriminatees,87 yet only
six co-workers replied to Cole-Rivera’s post. 88 Of course, the Facebook
“conversation” as reproduced in Tables 1 and 2 supra does not necessarily
reflect the true conversation that took place: the reader has no idea who read
each message, responding to Cole-Rivera’s post, at what time, or any
individual person read them whether there were additional comments posted
and later deleted before they could be responded to. When Cole-Rivera or
anyone else posted comments on Cole-Rivera’s original Facebook post,
they likely would have no idea who would read these comments; or even if
the persons they tried to address would read them.
Despite the uncertainty surrounding the intended, expected, and
actual audiences, and despite Cole-Rivera’s failure to explicitly tell anyone
that she sought an objective (i.e. correcting managerial misperceptions
84
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about the quality of the employees’ work), the majority in Hispanics United
found that Cole-Rivera had a “clear ‘mutual aid’ objective [or] object of
preparing her coworkers for group action [that] was implicitly manifest
from the surrounding circumstances.”89 In so doing, the Board treated the
record—the Facebook post and comments, as recorded supra Tables 1 and
2—as wholly-accurate facts made subject to the standard analysis on
whether employee concertedness exists. This treatment ignores these
Facebook posts’ mutability and their elements of uncertainty.
Social media communications are helpful, potentially highlyprobative evidentiary pieces. Labor law must bend and flex in such a way
that modes like Facebook sharing and Twitter retweets become usable in
rendering Board outcomes. At the same time, though, social media
communications’ evidentiary weight must be balanced against their unique
‘unknown’ dimensions. The Board could have balanced these competing
facets better in Hispanics United by giving special attention to any
developments (or the lack thereof) between the Facebook conversation and
the discriminatees’ termination three days later, or whether any of the
Facebook posts were edited or modified at any time. It would have been
incorrect to simply dismiss the entire Facebook conversation as unusable in
making the Board’s decision owing to these issues unique to social media.
Until law and technology catch up with one another on this area, however,
judicial bodies must limit their reliance on social media to a greater degree
than as occurred in Hispanics United.

B. Why Concerted Activity Analysis on Social Media Requires the
Nexus Requirement
Prior to the NLRB’s written decision in Hispanics United, many
writers analyzed the NLRB’s many judgments and decisions and had
already begun trying to determine a series of rules explaining what
employers could do with their social media policies to avoid erring on the
side of an unfair labor practice charge, frequently relying on language from
NLRB decisions that are less directly on point90 or else comparing multiple
cases to predict how the NLRB will treat an employer.91 This note will not
89
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undertake the same kind of meta-analysis that has been done so thoroughly
as legal scholars like Robert Sprague, especially since so many authors
reach a similar conclusion: enforcement of the NLRA’s larger prohibition
on § 7-chilling employer policies,92 as it relates to social media, has been
all over the map.93 In a note on employer policies involving social
networking, Ariana Green observed the number of inconsistent NLRB
decisions on social media in the last several years.94 Green blamed these
cases’ inconsistent results on “an over-reliance on the traditional concerted
activity standard,”95 and (besides recommending several very good ideas)96
called on the General Counsel for the NLRB to “allow NLRB attorneys
more leeway when online speech is protected on social networks,” so that
attorneys can “display more agility in considering the context of social
networking posts.”97
This proposal is incorrect. The traditional labor laws are not overrelied upon and in need of replacement; they must simply be restored and
applied. In order to allow employers and employees to engage in labor law
as it was designed, the NLRB should apply a consistent “nexus” analysis.98
This does not mean reversing the § 7 protection established under Meyers II
for the individual employee who “seek[s] to initiate or to induce or to
prepare for group action” but has not yet done so.99 This proposal only
requires that the plaintiff’s prima facie case sufficiently allege that the sort
of “mere griping” seen in Hispanics United was done in anticipation of
doing something about the problem, by providing some evidence that the
92
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court deems reliable and sufficient for the claim to go beyond “mere
allegations.”100
This proposal prevents employees from complaining in public about
work, then doubling back and claiming protected concerted activity under §
7 based on what they complained about (work) and not what they intended
(enacting concerted activity to do something about it, or merely vent their
personal exasperation). The nexus rule as applied allows employers to
discipline or discharge the gripers that are not sincerely interested in
concerted action, while maintaining the NLRB Office of General Counsel’s
strong prerogative to investigate charges for § 8(a)(1) violations involving
non-unionized employees’ concerted activity. If Cole-Rivera’s case were
done under these rules, for example, the employees could still win by
providing reliable testimony or other evidence for the fact-finder that they
were going to do something about their co-worker’s complaints to
management. This could be any sort of evidence that would convince the
fact-finder, such as screen captures of the Facebook pages, or testimony
from the employees alleging concertedness. Instead, the ALJ in Hispanics
United discredited the small amount of evidence that would show this
intent: Cole-Rivera’s testimony claiming her intent to speak with HUB’s
Executive Director to counteract Cruz-Moore’s complaints.101 Absent any
positive evidence of plans by the discriminatees to do anything besides
complain to one another, the HUB employees’ Facebook posts should be
construed only as “mere talk.”102

CONCLUSION
Social media perhaps may prove as transformative as many claim it
already is. Yet despite social media’s differences from other communicative
media, the same concerted action analysis, requiring a nexus between
activity and employee interests, ought to be applied. Without this nexus
requirement, § 7’s protection for concerted activity covers employee griping
whenever it is done without regard to employees’ intent, as had occurred in
Hispanics United. It is impossible “that any [and every] conversation
between employees comes within the ambit of activities protected by the
Act provided it relates to the interests of the employees,”103 because not all
griping leads to group action. This is especially for regarding social media,
where one worker’s missive to a “world-wide web” always lies within a few
mouse clicks.
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